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Measuring the Impact of a Trade Dispute with a Supply-side 
Shock Using a Supply-driven Input-Output Analysis: 
Korea-Japan Dispute Case† 
By DONGSEOK KIM* 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the impact of the recent Korea-
Japan trade dispute on the Korean economy using supply-driven input-
output analysis. In July 2019, Japan announced the decision to tighten 
the export control of three materials which are indispensable in the 
manufacturing of semiconductors and electronic display panels. 
Japan’s decision directly affects production in Korea’s semiconductor 
and display sectors and is hence not a demand shock. For this reason, 
a standard demand-driven input-output analysis is not valid despite the 
fact that it can still be applied. The impact of Japan’s decision on 
Korea’s aggregate and individual sectors’ gross output, GDP and 
employment were computed using both methods. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ountiries involved in trade disputes usually choose demand-side trade policy 
tools. Specifically, when there is a trade dispute or a trade ‘war’ between two 
countries, both countries choose trade policy tools that will exert negative demand 
shocks on the opposing country’s exports. Typical examples are tariffs and import 
quotas, both of which aim to reduce imports of the opposing country’s products. 
Some trade disputes enter an entirely different phase. Occasionally, for example, 
exports of products which are indispensable intermediate inputs in the opposing 
country’s key sectors are directly regulated or even embargoed. A striking instance 
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took place in August of 2020, when the United States announced new sanctions 
which prohibit any foreign company from supplying semiconductors produced using 
US technology to the Chinese company Huawei. In fact, the trade dispute between 
China and United States is said to have begun in 2018 or even years earlier, 
witnessing the use of many traditional trade policy tools, but recent policy tools 
would be regarded as supply-side tools in the sense that they affect the supply side 
of the market. 
Japan’s decision strictly to control the export of three materials which are essential 
to the production of semiconductors and display panels in July of 2019 was another 
striking example of a supply-side trade policy. This policy, which was said to initiate 
the Korea-Japan trade dispute, triggered a fierce conflict between the two nations 
afterwards. Japan’s decision remains in place as of December of 2020. 
Supply-side trade policy tools can be regarded as ‘strong’ or ‘extreme’ tools 
compared to demand-side tools, and trade disputes during which supply-side tools 
are employed tend to involve a greater variety of, and fiercer, phases. Usually, 
supply-side trade policy tools are not regarded as ‘traditional’ trade policy tools. 
Moreover, these tools affect the supply side of the controlled products directly, 
meaning that their impacts on both parties differ from the effects of demand-side 
tools. Additionally, the target country of supply-side tools, even when unspecified, 
is usually more obvious. 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the impact of the Korea-Japan trade 
dispute on the Korean economy by means of a supply-driven input-output (IO) 
analysis. It is possible to apply a traditional demand-driven IO analysis mechanically 
by ‘pretending’ that the change in production was caused by a final demand shock. 
However, a demand-driven IO analysis can be used only when the shock affects the 
final demand and thus cannot be applied to the current situation. Supply-driven IO 
analyses have been used in various situations but have not been applied to trade 
disputes with supply-side trade policy tools. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the motivation of the paper 
in more detail and reviews the literature. Sections 3 and 4 explain the methodology 
and the data, respectively, and the results of the paper are given in Section 5. Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Motivation and Literature 
  
Most trade disputes have significant impacts on the countries involved. Also, it is 
likely for trade disputes to escalate due to the involved countries’ efforts to have a 
greater impact on the opposing country so as to ‘win’ the dispute, causing the dispute 
to grow into a trade ‘war.’ 
Trade disputes can have various phases depending on many factors, such as the 
trade pattern between the countries involved, diplomatic relationships, political 
situations, the history of the disputes, and emotional factors, among others. The 
involved countries choose tools which may allow them to apply the strongest 
pressure on the opposing country. For example, demand-side tools such as tariffs or 
import quotas can be highly effective when the country is the biggest importer of the 
product in question. 
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Some policy tools affect the supply side of the products in question, as witnessed 
in the US-China and Korea-Japan disputes. In fact, the most influential and well-
known incident of the use of a supply-side trade policy tool took place during the 
‘first oil crisis’ in 1973-1974, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) reduced the production of crude oil radically and began 
controlling oil exports strictly, though this was not a trade ‘dispute.’ A similar process 
was repeated in the ‘second oil crisis’ of 1979-1980; the world economy experienced 
skyrocketing oil prices and significant damage in almost every sector during and 
after these two crises. 
The impact of demand-side policy tools on the opposing country can be measured 
using a standard demand-driven IO analysis, i.e., using the well-known formula 
1( )d I A Δy  , where I   is the identity matrix, dA   is the domestic input 
coefficient matrix and Δy  denotes the change in the final demand vector. This 
method, however, cannot be used for supply-side trade policy tools. Suppose that 
country A is the monopolistic producer of material AA, that AA is an indispensable 
raw material used to produce BB, and that BB is an important product in country B. 
Suppose that country A suddenly decreases their exports of AA. Unless country B 
succeeds in securing a substitute input for AA, the only option is to reduce the 
production of BB. Interrelated sectors will also be affected severely. 
This type of impact cannot be computed using the above formula because the 
shock occurs on the supply side and because the formula above can be applied only 
to demand shocks. In a demand-driven IO analysis, the amounts of gross output and 
intermediate inputs are key endogenous variables, and they are determined by the 
final demand for the products, the major exogenous variables. 
We have two options in this situation. The first is to apply the standard demand-
driven IO analysis. While we are not supposed to apply a demand-driven IO analysis, 
we can still use this method, just as we can apply, e.g., the ordinary least square 
method when its assumptions are violated. We compute or assume a change in 
production due to the dispute and then assume that it was caused by a demand shock. 
The second option is to use a supply-driven IO analysis. This was initially 
suggested by Ghosh (1958) and has been used in situations with supply-side shocks. 
However, the standard supply-driven IO analysis can be used only when the shock 
affects the value-added components, for example, a change in labor supply which 
affects the compensation of employees. 
It is necessary briefly to explain the mechanics of a demand-driven IO analysis at 
this point. Upon the realization of a demand shock, the response of the supply side 
is to change production by the same amount because in IO analysis, the supply side 
is assumed to be infinitely elastic. This requires additional domestic intermediate 
inputs, imported intermediate inputs and primary production factors, of which the 
first is met by increases in production in the corresponding sectors, the second by 
imports, and the third by households. This is the second round, and the subsequent 
rounds are repeated infinitely in the same manner. The total impact is the sum of the 
impacts in each round, and we can compute the changes in production, value-added, 
imports and employment in individual sectors and in the entire economy as the sums 
of infinite geometric series. Considering that the analysis is interested in the sectors 
in the upstream which provide raw materials to the affected sector, we can refer to 
the impact of the shock in a demand-driven analysis as the ‘backward linkage effect.’ 
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A supply-driven IO analysis is interested in the impact of the shock on the sectors 
downstream to which the affected sector supplies intermediate input. Suppose that 
the production of a sector is decreased as the result of a supply shock. The product 
of the affected sector is used as a raw material in other sectors, which implies that 
other sectors also experience a decreased supply of this raw material and will be 
forced to decrease their production. This chain reaction will proceed infinitely in the 
same manner. The total impact is the sum of the infinitely many impacts in each 
round, and we can compute the decreases in gross output, value-added, imports and 
employment in individual sectors and in the entire economy. Considering that the 
analysis is interested in the sectors downstream to which the affected sector supplies 
raw materials, we refer to this impact as the ‘forward linkage effect.’ 
In order to apply a supply-driven IO analysis, however, we need to modify the 
method slightly because the shock did not affect value-added but gross output. For 
this purpose, we ‘exogenize’ the ‘affected’ sector, the sector BB in the 
aforementioned example, that is, the sector in which the embargoed product is used 
as an essential input. If the supply of product AA, whether domestic or imported, is 
reduced and cannot be replaced, then the affected sector is forced to reduce its gross 
output. Therefore, the gross output of the affected sector can no longer be treated as 
an endogenous variable. The gross output of the exogenized sector is treated as an 
exogenous variable in the supply-driven IO analysis. 
The first step in this method is to estimate the decrease in the production of the 
affected sector. It is important to note that at the outset of the dispute, the decrease 
in the production of the affected sector will depend on the decrease in the material 
in question but will be gradually relieved for several reasons, such as import 
substitution, diversification of suppliers, and/or an improvement of the dispute due 
to negotiations. 
The analysis proceeds in two directions from this stage. The estimated decrease in 
the production of the affected sector is used to compute its backward linkage effect, 
i.e., its impact on other endogenous sectors and on the entire economy using an 
ordinary demand-driven IO analysis. In the opposite direction, its forward linkage 
effect is computed by means of a supply-driven IO analysis. The overall impact is 
the sum of the two effects. 
The body of literature on the demand-driven IO analysis is enormous such that 
reviewing the literature is almost impossible. In fact, it can be said that the demand-
driven analysis was the primary objective of Leontief’s invention of IO tables and 
his analyses. Reyes and Mendoza (2013) noted that out of two main identities inside 
the IO tables, “Leontief concentrated his attention on the first one (the one which 
leads to the demand-driven IO analysis, specifically the Leontief inverse matrix).” 
The impact of most shocks which affect the final demand of an economy or can 
be converted into such shocks can be computed by means of a demand-driven 
analysis. Most government expenditures, changes in household consumption levels, 
firms’ new investment projects, and changes in exports are typical examples. In 
recent decades, many countries compute the economic impacts of public 
infrastructure projects using a demand-driven IO analysis to enhance the efficiency 
of public finance. Korea’s Prefeasibility Studies performed by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and the Korea Development Institute which began in 1999 
represents a good example. 
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The demand-driven IO analysis has also been used to measure the impact of trade 
disputes. Tian and Yang (2014) conducted a demand-driven IO analysis to measure 
the impact of the EU-China trade dispute around photovoltaic products. They used 
China’s IO tables and computed the impact of antidumping on China’s export of 
photovoltaic products and on the GDP of China. An IO analysis was also applied to 
a political dispute. Wu et al. (2016) used a demand-driven IO analysis to measure 
indirect economic losses in China caused by the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, or 
Senkaku Islands, in 2012, which affected China’s international trade. 
The recent US-China trade dispute which started in 2017 invited a large number 
of studies. Considering the positions of the two countries in the world economy, the 
potential impact of the dispute, when it develops into a full-scale trade war, can be 
disastrous to most of their trade partner countries, not to mention themselves. For 
this reason, the dispute worried not only governments but also researchers all around 
the world, and almost every possible methodology has been employed to forecast the 
impact of the dispute. 
Tyers and Zhou (2019) used a multi-region general equilibrium model and 
considered various scenarios to forecast the impact of the US-China dispute. Song 
and Lee (2018) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to predict the 
economic impact of the US-China trade dispute. They considered several scenarios 
and forecasted the impacts on various macroeconomic variables of Korea as well as 
other countries involved. 
Gentile et al. (2020) also applied a CGE model and used the Asian Development 
Bank’s Multiregional Input-Output Tables (ADB MRIOT) to measure the impact of 
the US-China trade dispute on the involved countries and on the world economy. 
Two scenarios were considered in their study: the current state as of May of 2019 
(the first scenario) and a ‘full-scale tariff war’ (an additional 25% tariff on all 
imported products). They computed the impacts on various aggregate variables of 
the US, China and many trade partner countries, at the same time showing, however, 
that some countries would benefit from the dispute by absorbing some import 
demand from both countries. 
Additionally, the demand-driven IO analysis was used in many studies to forecast 
the impact of the US-China trade dispute. We can think of two main reasons. First, 
the IO analysis is relatively easy to use, apply and adjust, and the computation is fast. 
It involves relatively simple matrix operations, which can be executed on most 
desktop computers. Second, more countries are producing IO tables in recent years, 
and in particular, the recent availability of multi-country IO tables such as the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD) has made it easy to compute the impact of a demand 
shock on the countries included in the database. 
Jung (2017) assumed that the trade dispute will reduce both countries’ mutual 
trade by 10% and computed the impact on the GDPs of China, the US, and Korea 
using a demand-driven analysis with WIOD. He estimated that Korea’s GDP will 
decrease by 0.35%, with the proviso that the estimate depends on numerous 
unexpected factors. Kim and Kim (2018) also used a demand-driven IO analysis and 
the WIOT to forecast the impact of the US-China trade dispute on the Korean 
economy. They estimated the impacts on various aggregate variables and provided 
policy recommendations for Korea. 
Abiad et al. (2018) also utilized the ADB MRIOT to forecast the impact of the 
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US-China trade dispute. The ADB MRIOT consists of the IO tables of 62 countries 
and 35 sectors, and in their study it was used to measure the impact on the GDP, 
exports and employment of developing ADB member countries as well as the US 
and developed European countries. They considered three scenarios: the status quo, 
‘the worse’ scenario and ‘the worst’ scenario, also conducting a demand-driven IO 
analysis. 
Xia et al. (2019) applied a demand-driven IO analysis to the 2013 edition of 
WIOD and forecasted the impact of the 2017 US-China trade dispute. The primary 
field of interest in their study was the energy sector, and they computed the impacts 
of the dispute in various scenarios on the GDP and energy consumption of not only 
the countries involved but also many of their trade partner countries. 
Finally, a demand-driven IO analysis was also applied to the Korea-Japan trade 
dispute. Jeong et al. (2019) used the ADB MRIOT and computed the economic 
impact of the dispute on Southeast Asian countries using an indirect approach. They 
computed the contribution of Korea’s export of electronic components, including 
semiconductors, to the GDPs of these countries, from which they concluded that the 
decrease in Korea’s production of semiconductors due to the dispute could be 
detrimental to the Southeast Asian countries. 
Jung et al. (2019) conducted the empirical study most pertinent to the motivation 
of this paper. They provided (i) the details and the expected consequences of Japan’s 
export control of the three materials in July of 2019, (ii) the history of Japan’s export 
of the three materials since their strengthening of export control and (iii) a reckoning 
of the aftermath of the dispute to Korea and Japan. For quantitative forecasts, they 
made two separate assumptions: (1) Korea’s production of semiconductors will 
decrease by 10%; and (2) Japan’s exports of chemical products, electronic equipment 
and machinery will decrease by 5%. Then they used a CGE model to predict the 
impacts on the Korean economy. They estimated that when Korea’s semiconductor 
production decreases by 10%, Korea’s GDP and total exports will decrease by 
0.320~0.384% and 0.347~0.579%, respectively, depending on the monopolistic 
power of Korea’s semiconductor supply. They also predicted that Korea’s GDP and 
exports will decrease by 0.06% and 0.089%, respectively, as the result of the second 
assumption. 
The supply-driven input-output analysis was devised by Ghosh (1958). He 
considered an economy in which firms’ behaviors differ from those in Leontief’s 
system. Clearly, both Leontief and Ghosh used the same input-output system, but 
Leontief assumed that the final demand is exogenous, the supply side is infinitely 
elastic, and the input coefficients are fixed or highly stable, whereas Ghosh assumed 
that value-added is exogenous and the distribution structure of the final products in 
terms of the composition of customers is fixed or highly stable. Two sets of 
assumptions, even with same tables, lead to two entirely different ways of analyzing 
the impacts of ‘shocks’ on endogenous variables, correspondingly referred to here as 
demand-driven and supply-driven IO analyses. Reyes and Mendoza (2013) 
compared the two types of analysis and provided a compact theoretical explanation 
of the difference and the relationship between them. 
As described earlier, a supply-driven IO analysis can be applied when the 
production of a certain sector is affected due to an exogenous reason, in other words, 
when the gross output of a sector ‘must’ be reduced due to a reason unrelated to the 
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final demand. While there can be a wide variety of causes, they can be sorted into 
three categories: (i) an exogenous shortage of labor such as a labor shortage due to a 
labor market mismatch and or a strike; (ii) an exogenous shortage of capital, that is, 
damage to the production capacity due to a natural disaster such as an earthquake or 
a flood, or non-natural causes such as accidents or a failed loan extension; and (iii) 
an exogenous shortage of intermediate inputs, especially when they cannot be easily 
replaced, caused by a natural disaster, e.g., a supply shortage of electricity due to an 
earthquake, or a non-natural accident, such as a reduction or stoppage of the supply 
of key materials, parts or components essential in a certain sector. Obviously, Japan’s 
decision strictly to control the exports of the three materials essential for producing 
electronic displays and semiconductors is one of the most pertinent examples of the 
third category. 
Davis and Salkin (1984) measured the impact of an exogenous decrease in the 
supply of water to the agricultural sector of the Kern County, California, US, on the 
value-added of various sectors and the aggregate economy of the county using both 
ordinary demand- and supply-driven IO analyses. The impact on the county’s aggregate 
value-added computed from the supply-driven analysis was approximately 71% of 
that computed from the demand-driven analysis, and they concluded that the forward-
linkage effect of the agricultural sector is weaker than the backward-linkage effect. 
Chen and Rose (1986) studied the ‘joint stability’ of input and output coefficients 
theoretically and provided a short empirical work. As explained earlier, the demand-
driven and the supply-driven IO analyses assume that input and output coefficients 
are fixed or highly stable, respectively. After the work of Ghosh (1958), many 
researchers studied if both sets of coefficients can be stable at the same time, in 
particular when the disturbance is not small. They showed that joint stability is 
theoretically possible, and provided an empirical example. They assumed that the 
supply of aluminum into Taiwan decreases by 50%, a major disturbance, assumed 
that output coefficients are fixed, and showed that the resulting changes in input 
coefficients are small at less than 1% in most sectors. 
Groenewold et al. (1987) applied a supply-driven IO analysis to answer frequently 
asked questions in industrial and regional economics related to the ‘contribution of 
a certain industry to the total employment in a region.’ They addressed this issue by 
treating the industry in question as exogenous and applying a supply-driven IO 
analysis. 
Roberts (1994) measured the economic impact of the quota on milk production on 
the UK economy using a modified IO analysis. She suggested that both backward 
and forward linkage effects be considered and showed that in the milk industry, the 
former type is more significant than the latter. Leung and Pooley (2002) estimated 
the economic impact of a 100% reduction in longline fishing on Hawaii’s economy. 
They claimed that a demand-driven approach is not appropriate because the shock 
was not initiated by the demand side, and they applied a supply-driven IO analysis 
to estimate the impact. Fernández-Macho et al. (2008) used a supply-driven IO 
analysis to estimate the impact of the reduction in the total allowable catch of cod 
and hake on the economy of Galicia, Spain. Seung and Waters (2009) also used a 
supply-driven approach to estimate the backward and forward linkage effects of the 
fishery sector in Alaska. They classified the fishery sector into multiple subsectors 
and measured their backward and forward effects separately. They also conducted 
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numerous policy simulations and estimated various economic impacts. 
Kim (2015) applied a supply-driven IO analysis to the case of the 2010-2011 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth (FAM) disease in Korea, one of the most serious 
incidents of FAM in the world. He computed the backward and forward linkage 
effects of the outbreak on individual sectors and on the national economy, and 
identified the sectors with the strongest backward and forward effects. He also 
showed that the estimated impact by a supply-driven analysis is greater than that by 
a demand-driven analysis. 
Studies in this field agree that a supply-driven IO analysis is desired when the 
exogenous shock affects production, not the final demand, because the standard 
demand-driven IO analysis does not capture all economic impacts. Obviously, 
Japan’s decision strictly to control the exports of three materials would directly affect 
production in the semiconductor and display sectors in Korea and not the final 
demands, which justifies the use of a supply-driven IO analysis. While the event fits 
the framework and satisfies the assumptions of the supply-driven IO type of analysis, 
empirical applications to the Korea-Japan trade dispute could not be found, and it is 
the goal of this paper to estimate the economic impacts in this manner. This paper 
follows the methodology adopted by Leung and Pooley (2002), Fernández-Macho 





Let dA  be the n n  domestic input coefficient matrix of an economy, where 
n  is the number of products/sectors. Also, let x  and dy  be the 1n  vectors of 
the gross output and domestic final demand, respectively. The market clearing 
conditions for domestic products can be expressed as d d x A x y , where the terms 
on the right-hand side represent the intermediate and final demand for domestic 
products, respectively. The solution to the market clearing condition is 
1( )d d x I A y , or, equivalently,  
(1)       1( )d d   x I A y . 
The n n   matrix 
1( )d I A   is called the Leontief inverse matrix, and it 
measures the backward linkage effects. The ( , )i j  th element of 1( )d I A  
measures the change in the gross output of the i th sector when the domestic final 
demand for the j  th product changes by one unit. Thus, the j  th column of 
1( )d I A  gives the impacts of the domestic final demand for the j th product on 
the gross output of individual sectors. 
Suppose an exogenous shock affects the gross outputs of particular sectors, and 
let 
1
n  be the number of affected sectors. Assume, without a loss of generality, that 
the affected sectors are the first 
1
n  sectors. As mentioned in the previous section, 
we can mechanically apply a demand-driven IO analysis, that is, we can apply (1). 
This implies we assume, incorrectly, that the exogenous shock affected the final 
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demands of the 
1
n  sectors and that the magnitude of the shock is identical to the 
reductions in the gross outputs. In this case, the impacts of the shock on individual 
industries are represented by the first 
1
n  columns of 
1( )d I A , that is an 
1
n n   
matrix. 
We now move to the supply-driven IO analysis, and we will derive the procedure 
for the backward linkage effect first. Let 
2
n  be the number of unaffected sectors; i.e., 
2 1
n n n  . The market clearing condition for domestic products, 
d d
 x A x y , can 
be partitioned into the affected and the unaffected sectors, as follows: 
(2)      
1 111 12 1
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Because the shock affects the first 
1
n   sectors, their gross outputs are not 
determined by their final demands. Accordingly, they are no longer endogenous. 
Hence, the first equation in (2) does not hold, and we only consider the second; i.e., 
2 21 1 22 2 2
d d d
  x A x A x y . This is the market clearing condition for the 
2
n  unaffected 
sectors in which the 
2
x  variables are endogenous variables which depend on the 
exogenous variables 
1
x   and 
2
d
y  . We solve the equation for 
2
x  , and we get 
1
2 22 21 1 2
( ) ( )d d d  x I A A x y , or, equivalently, 
(3)     1
2 22 21 1





 y 0 . The 
2 1
n n  matrix 
1
22 21
( )d dI A A  measures the backward 
linkage effects of 
1
x  on 
2
x . 
Let dB  be the domestic output coefficient matrix; that is, [ ] [ / ]d d dij ij ib x x B  . 
Here, /d dij ij ib x x is the share of the i th product out of the total gross output, which 
is used as the intermediate input in the j th sector. It can be interpreted as the direct 
forward linkage effect of the i th product on the j th sector, and is referred to as the 
‘output coefficient,’ compared to the ‘input coefficient’ /d dij ij ja x x  . Output 
coefficients are also called ‘allocation,’ ‘supply’ or ‘sales’ coefficients. 
The decomposition of the total cost can be expressed as ' d m  x w w v , where 
the left-hand side refers to total cost or total input while the terms on the right-hand 
side refer to the domestic intermediate input, the imported intermediate input and the 
value-added. We can show that 'd dw x B , and the above equation becomes 
(4)      ' ' d m  x x B w v . 
Upon solving (4) for x , we get 
1' ( )( )m d   x w v I B , or equivalently, 
(5)      1' ( )d    x v I B  
38 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2021 
assuming that m w 0 . This result can be found in Ghosh (1958, p.61), Miller and 
Blair (2009, p.547), and in the Bank of Korea (2014, p.138). This formula gives the 
increases in the gross outputs of individual sectors when the value-added vector 
changes by v . The matrix 1( )d I B  is called the ‘output inverse matrix’ or the 
‘Ghosh inverse matrix,’ and it plays a role similar to that played by 1( )d I A  in the 
demand-driven IO analysis. 
Equation (4) can be partitioned for the affected and unaffected sectors, as follows: 
(6)        11 121 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
21 22





      
 
B B
x x x x w w v v
B B
. 
Because the shock affects the first 
1
n  sectors, the first equation in (6) does not 
hold, and we only consider the second, 
2 1 12 2 22 2 2
' ' ' ' '
d d m
   x x B x B w v . In this 
equation, the 
2
x  variables are endogenous variables which depend on the exogenous 
variables 
1
x   and 
2
v  . We solve the equation for 
2
x  , and we get 
1
2 1 12 2 2 22
' ( ' ' ')( )d m d    x x B w v I B , or equivalently,  
(7)   1
2 12 22 1




   w v 0  . The 
2 1
n n  matrix 
1
12 22
[ ( ) ]'d d B I B  measures the 
forward linkage effects of 
1
x  on 
2
x . 
We have one more effect of the exogenous shock, which is the direct impact of the 
shock on 
1
x , i.e., 
1
x . It is the initial component of the shock from which backward 
and forward linkage effects proceed in the opposite directions, but it needs to be 
counted only once. In this paper, we will simply regard it as a component of the 
backward linkage effect. For this reason, we will stack an identity matrix of size 
1 1
n n   on top of 
1
22 21
( )d dI A A   and a zero matrix of size 
1 1
n n   on top of 
1
12 22
[ ( ) ]'d d B I B  for the sake of notational and computational convenience. 
In sum, we have three 
1
n n  matrices of multipliers which measure the impacts 
of 
1
x  on 
2
x ; (i) impacts computed using a standard demand-driven IO analysis 
given by the first 
1
n  columns of 
1( )d I A , (ii) direct and backward linkage effects 
from a supply-driven IO analysis computed by 1
22 21
( )d dI A A  , and (iii) forward 
linkage effects computed by 1
12 22
[ ( ) ]'d d B I B . After these effects on gross outputs are 
computed, the impacts on value-added and employment can be computed by 




As mentioned in section 1, we will apply the above method to the Korea-Japan 
trade dispute to measure its impact on the Korean economy. For this purpose, we 
used the IO tables of Korea in 2018, the most recent IO tables of Korea. Korea’s 
2018 IO tables are available at four levels of sector classification, with 33, 83, 165 
and 381 sectors, of which the tables with 83 sectors were used in this paper because  
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TABLE 1—24-SECTOR CLASSIFICATION 
No. Sector 83-Sector number Remark 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 31 
Exogenous sectors 
2 Electronic signal equipment 32 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 1~5  
4 Mined and quarried goods 6~7  
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 8~10  
6 Textile and leather products 11~12  
7 Wood and paper products 13~15  
8 Petroleum and coal products 16  
9 Chemical products 17~24  
10 Non-metallic mineral products 25~26  
11 Basic metal products 27~29  
12 Fabricated metal products 30  
13 Electric and Electronic products 33~37 Excluding semiconductor and display 
14 Machinery and equipment 38~39  
15 Transport equipment 40~42  
16 Other manufactured products 43~44  
17 Utility 45~49 
Electricity, gas, steam, hot water, water, 
sewage, waste treatment, etc. 
18 Construction 50~51  
19 Wholesale and retail 52  
20 Transportation, storage and postal 53~57  
21 Food service and accommodation 58  
22 Business Service 59~74 
Communication, broadcasting, IT, 
publishing, financial, real estate, R&D, 
professional service, etc. 
23 Public administration and defense 75  
24 Social and personal services 76~83 
Education, medical, social care, cultural, 
tour-related, sports, repair and other 
personal services 
 
they are the tables with the smallest number of sectors in which the semiconductor 
and electronic display sectors are separately represented. 
In this paper, the 83-sector classification was rearranged into a 24-sector 
classification, in which the semiconductor and electronic display sectors were 
located in the beginning of the classification, as shown in Table 1.1 Gross output, 
value-added, exports and employment of these 24 sectors in 2018 are given in Table 
2. Note that in 2018, the affected sectors, 1 and 2, account for approximately 5% of 
the total gross output and value-added in Korea, whereas they account for more than 





2n  , 
2
22n   and 24n  . 
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TABLE 2—GROSS OUTPUT, VALUE-ADDED, EXPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT OF 24 SECTORS IN 2018 
(Unit: trillion won, thousand persons) 
No. Sector Gross output Value-added Export Employment 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 134.4 78.0 122.8 88 
2 Electronic signal equipment 64.3 23.8 40.6 57 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 62.8 33.2 0.8 1,222 
4 Mined and quarried goods 4.5 2.2 0.1 18 
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 132.8 33.7 8.2 337 
6 Textile and leather products 72.6 14.6 26.2 269 
7 Wood and paper products 47.0 15.2 4.2 173 
8 Petroleum and coal products 144.5 36.4 55.8 11 
9 Chemical products 286.3 76.8 103.1 450 
10 Non-metallic mineral products 44.0 13.4 4.6 111 
11 Basic metal products 145.6 27.6 45.0 131 
12 Fabricated metal products 100.5 35.9 13.0 347 
13 Electric and Electronic products 235.8 68.5 88.7 498 
14 Machinery and equipment 146.2 43.3 57.8 414 
15 Transport equipment 225.7 47.8 96.8 456 
16 Other manufactured products 87.6 37.3 4.8 608 
17 Utility 122.7 38.4 0.5 205 
18 Construction 271.8 118.8 0.2 1,804 
19 Wholesale and retail 280.0 150.6 31.5 3,428 
20 Transportation, storage and postal 149.7 53.4 33.2 1,398 
21 Food service and accommodation 164.0 55.5 9.9 1,945 
22 Business Service 874.8 532.2 42.0 4,529 
23 Public administration and defense 151.4 114.9 0.0 1,203 
24 Social and personal services 387.3 221.8 2.1 4,795 
Total 4,336.6 1,873.4 792.1 24,495 




In July of 2019, Japan announced the decision to tighten the export control of three 
materials: fluorinated polyimide, photoresist and hydrogen fluoride. Fluorinated 
polyimide is an essential material in the manufacturing of LCD and OLED display 
panels, which, in turn, are essential parts in the manufacturing of smartphones and 
televisions, which account for a major portion of the Korean economy. Photoresist 
and hydrogen fluoride are essential materials in the manufacturing of memory 
semiconductors, which not only constitute a substantial portion of the Korean 
economy but also are essential parts in the manufacturing of various ICT products 
and electronic equipment. 
Table 3 confirms that Japan’s shares are substantial in Korea’s import of these 
three materials as well as in the world markets, while Korea’s shares in Japan’s 
exports are much smaller. Furthermore, the affected sectors represent a major portion 
of the Korean economy, and three additional sectors, in this case other electronic  
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TABLE 3—MARKET SITUATIONS OF THE THREE MATERIALS 
Product 
Japan’s share in 
the world market 
Japan’s share in 
Korea’s import 
Korea’s share in 
Japan’s export 
Fluorinated polyimide Around 90% 93.7% 22.5% 
Photoresist Around 90% 91.9% 11.7% 
Hydrogen fluoride Around 70% 43.9% 85.9% 
Source: KITA, July 1, 3 and 10, 2019.  
 
TABLE 4—AFFECTED SECTORS IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY IN 2018 
(Unit: trillion won, thousand persons) 
83-sector number Sector Gross Output Value-added Export Employment 
31 Semiconductor and related devices 134.4  78.0 122.8  87.8 
32 Electronic signal equipment  64.3  23.8  40.6  57.1 
33 Other electronic components  23.1   7.2   9.0  66.2 
34 Computer and peripheral equipment  13.5   4.9   9.7  11.4 
35 Telecomm., video, and audio equip.  56.6  14.1  27.0  59.3 
Total 291.8 128.0 209.1 281.9 
(Shares in all sectors) (6.7%) (6.8%) (26.4%) (1.2%) 
All sectors 4,336.6 1,873.4 792.1 24,495.4 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
components; computer and peripheral equipment; and telecommunication, video, 
and audio equipment, would be severely affected because semiconductors and 
display panels are indispensable in these sectors. These five sectors accounted for 
26.4% of Korea’s total exports, 6.7~6.8% of the total gross output and GDP, and 
1.2% of total employment in 2018. See Table 4. 
In order to apply the supply-driven IO analysis, we need to estimate, or at least 
make a rigorous assumption of, the magnitude of the direct impact of the shock on 
the gross output of the affected sectors, i.e., 
1
x  in equations (3) and (7). In other 
words, we need to estimate the changes in the production levels of the affected 
sectors. 
This estimation is straightforward in some situations. In the work by Kim (2015), 
for example, the official numbers of culled animals infected by foot-and-mouth 
disease were published, from which the production decreases in the corresponding 
sectors could be estimated almost exactly. There are other situations in which a 
precise estimation of the change in production in the affected sector is 
straightforward. Production quotas are a typical example. 
Unfortunately, however, this is complicated in some situations, specifically when 
the relationship between the shock and the direct impact is uncertain, as in the case 
of Japan’s export control. If the three materials are perfectly irreplaceable and if 
Japan enforces the embargo strictly, the production levels of Korea’s semiconductor 
and display sectors will then decrease by 91.9% and 93.7%, representing Japan’s 
shares in Korea’s imports of fluorinated polyimide and photoresist, respectively 
(Table 3). 
However, these figures highly overestimate the actual impact even if the above 
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assumptions are true because it is possible for the firms in these sectors to have 
accumulated sufficient inventories of the materials and prepare alternative materials 
while the stockpiles last. In this sense, the above figures could be regarded as the 
maximum level of the direct impact. 
Hong (2020) computed the actual imports of the three materials before and after 
the shock using trade statistics, which are given in Table 5. That study found that (i) 
the import of fluorinated polyimide from Japan rather increased and that Japan’s 
share did not change much after the control, suggesting that Japan did not enforce 
the decision strictly. In addition, a Korean company succeeded in localizing the 
material. It was also found that (ii) the import of photoresist from Japan dropped 
significantly directly after Japan’s decision, but it recovered quickly to the level 
before the shock. Japan’s share decreased by 6.1%p from 92.8% to 86.7%, but was 
replaced by a detour import through Belgium. This was possible because Japan did 
not restrict the export of the material to Korea through a third country. In other words, 
the import of photoresist from Japan did not change much. Finally, it was found that 
(iii) the import of hydrogen fluoride from Japan dropped severely after Japan’s 
decision. A major portion of the import of this product was replaced by supplies from 
domestic firms and from Chinese and Taiwanese firms. 
It can be concluded from Table 5 that the impact of Japan’s export control on 
production in the semiconductor and display sectors was insignificant. In fact, Hong 
(2020) concluded that the impact was limited. This conclusion, however, 
underestimates the impact on production in the affected sectors for many reasons. 
First, the data in Table 5 consider only the short-term impact and may underestimate 
the impact if the production levels of the affected sectors were increasing. Second, 
the data in Table 5 do not take the inventory of the materials into consideration and 
may underestimate the impact if the inventory levels of the materials were exhausted. 
Third, Japan’s decision has not changed since the outset of the export control, and it 
is possible that Japan will enforce the decision more strictly. 
  
TABLE 5—IMPORTS OF THE THREE MATERIALS SINCE JAPAN’S EXPORT CONTROL 
(Unit: million US dollar) 
 Before control After control 
  2018 July 2019~May 2020 
 12 months 11 months 
Fluorinated polyimide Total 24 32 
 From Japan 22 30 
 (share) (92.7%) (92.9%) 
Photoresist Total 286 317 
 From Japan 265 275 
 (share) (92.8%) (86.7%) 
Hydrogen fluoride Total 147 70 
 From Japan 63 7 
 (share) (42.4%) (9.5%) 
Note: Japan’s shares in this table are slightly different from those in Table 3. 
Source: Hong (2020). 
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In order to estimate the direct impact more rigorously, the actual production and 
the exports of the affected sectors were also studied. First, the manufacturing 
production index of the semiconductor sector since 2017 is presented in Figure 1.2 
Note that the production levels of semiconductors since July of 2019 were all larger 
than those in July of 2019. This can be regarded as an evidence that Japan’s decision 
did not have an impact on semiconductor production in Korea. However, the 
fluctuation in early 2020 may have stemmed from the unstable supply of the raw 
material, and the growth trend since early 2020 could be seen as slightly lower 
compared to the trend in 2019. 
Exports of semiconductors and displays and their year-on-year growth rates are 
given in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. As shown in Figure 2, exports of 
semiconductors and displays in 2019 were lower than those in 2018, resulting in 
negative growth rates in 2019, as can be observed in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 
3, however, the growth rates of the exports of the two products (thick solid and 
broken curves) were lower than that of total exports (thin solid curve), even after the 
base effect was exhausted. Moreover, the gap is roughly 10%. If we interpret the 
total exports as an indicator of the global economic trend, the gap can then be 
regarded as an impact that cannot be explained by economic trends worldwide. It is 
possible that Japan’s decision was one of the causes despite the fact that it is not easy 
to determine the source of the gap quantitatively due to the insufficient number of 
observations. 
Considering the above information, we assume that the direct impact of Japan’s 
export control on the affected sectors is a 10% decrease in production; that is, the 
gross outputs of the semiconductor and display sectors decrease by 10% each as a 
result of Japan’s export control. Subsequently, we compute its impact on other 
sectors and on the national economy using standard demand-driven and supply-
driven IO analyses. Thus far, Jung et al. (2019) present the only quantitative study 
of this issue, also assuming that Korea’s semiconductor production will decrease by 
10%. 
It should be noted that an IO analysis is linear and additive and that the results 
can therefore be used for various scenarios. When the production of the affected 
 
 
FIGURE 1. MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION INDEX: SEMICONDUCTOR 
Source: Statistics Korea. 
 







3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9









44 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2021 
 
FIGURE 2. MONTHLY EXPORTS OF SEMICONDUCTORS AND DISPLAYS (AMOUNTS) 
Source: Korea International Trade Association. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. MONTHLY EXPORTS OF SEMICONDUCTORS AND DISPLAYS (GROWTH RATES) 
Source: Korea International Trade Association. 
 
sectors decreases by 15%, for example, the impact on other sectors and on the 
national economy can easily be obtained simply by multiplying the results obtained 
later in this paper by 1.5. 
Backward and forward linkage coefficients are given in Table 6. As mentioned 
earlier, the direct impacts of the shock, a 2 2  identity matrix, are included in the 
backward linkage effect coefficient vectors. According to Table 6, the overall 
backward linkage coefficients for semiconductors and displays were 1.2426 and 
1.4505, respectively. This implies that the corresponding backward impacts of one-
unit exogenous shocks in these two sectors on the upstream sectors which provide 
raw materials to these sectors are 0.2426 and 0.4505 units. 
Table 6 shows that the business service sector is most severely affected by the 
shocks in both the semiconductor and display sectors, signifying that both sectors 
heavily depend on high-tech professional services. Chemical products, other electric 
and electronic products, and the utility, wholesale and trade and transportation 
sectors also receive significant backward linkage impacts from the shocks in the 
semiconductor and display sectors. 
The overall forward linkage coefficients were estimated at 0.0551 and 0.3420, 
respectively, implying that the forward impacts of one-unit exogenous shocks in 
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TABLE 6—BACKWARD AND FORWARD LINKAGE COEFFICIENTS ON GROSS OUTPUT ACCORDING TO THE 
SUPPLY-DRIVEN IO ANALYSIS 
No. Sector 
Backward linkage Forward linkage 
Semi-conductor Display Semi-conductor Display 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 Electronic signal equipment 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 0.0012 0.0019 0.0002 0.0007 
4 Mined and quarried goods 0.0003 0.0040 0.0000 0.0001 
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0025 0.0040 0.0004 0.0020 
6 Textile and leather products 0.0018 0.0031 0.0003 0.0015 
7 Wood and paper products 0.0026 0.0049 0.0002 0.0009 
8 Petroleum and coal products 0.0060 0.0143 0.0002 0.0011 
9 Chemical products 0.0283 0.0624 0.0010 0.0043 
10 Non-metallic mineral products 0.0013 0.0531 0.0002 0.0010 
11 Basic metal products 0.0226 0.0177 0.0005 0.0024 
12 Fabricated metal products 0.0051 0.0085 0.0007 0.0035 
13 Electric and Electronic products 0.0303 0.0408 0.0212 0.1905 
14 Machinery and equipment 0.0098 0.0052 0.0045 0.0267 
15 Transport equipment 0.0015 0.0034 0.0031 0.0261 
16 Other manufactured products 0.0209 0.0225 0.0019 0.0099 
17 Utility 0.0183 0.0457 0.0006 0.0033 
18 Construction 0.0012 0.0017 0.0021 0.0141 
19 Wholesale and retail 0.0208 0.0314 0.0013 0.0048 
20 Transportation, storage and postal 0.0133 0.0345 0.0007 0.0042 
21 Food service and accommodation 0.0059 0.0094 0.0007 0.0032 
22 Business Service 0.0454 0.0763 0.0117 0.0260 
23 Public administration and defense 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0016 
24 Social and personal services 0.0035 0.0055 0.0034 0.0138 
Total 1.2426 1.4505 0.0551 0.3420 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
as raw materials are 0.0551 and 0.3420 units, respectively. Small forward linkage 
coefficients of semiconductors are rooted in the peculiar output structure in this case. 
Out of a total production amount of about 134 trillion won, only 7.4%, or close to 10 
trillion won, is used as raw materials in the country, while most of the production, 
123 trillion won, is exported. The share of intermediate demand as a percent of gross 
output is 36.5% for displays, and this share is greater for other manufactured 
products. Kim (2015) reports that the overall forward linkage coefficients for dairy 
cattle, beef cattle and swine are 1.318, 1.554 and 1.787, respectively, which are much 
greater than those for semiconductor and display panels. 
The sector of other electric and electronic products is most severely affected by 
the shocks in both sectors, which is intuitive given that semiconductors and display 
panels are essential components in those sectors. The results of this paper also imply 
that machinery, transport equipment and construction are other important downstream 
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TABLE 7—COEFFICIENTS OF GROSS OUTPUT FROM SUPPLY-DRIVEN AND DEMAND-DRIVEN ANALYSES 
No. Sector 
Supply-driven Demand-driven 
Semi-conductor Display Semi-conductor Display 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 1.0000 0.0000 1.0421 0.0069 
2 Electronic signal equipment 0.0000 1.0000 0.0019 1.2002 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 0.0013 0.0026 00012 0.0023 
4 Mined and quarried goods 0.0004 0.0042 0.0004 0.0049 
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0029 0.0060 0.0026 0.0048 
6 Textile and leather products 0.0022 0.0046 0.0019 0.0038 
7 Wood and paper products 0.0028 0.0058 0.0027 0.0059 
8 Petroleum and coal products 0.0062 0.0154 0.0062 0.0172 
9 Chemical products 0.0293 0.0667 0.0296 0.0751 
10 Non-metallic mineral products 0.0015 0.0541 0.0014 0.0638 
11 Basic metal products 0.0231 0.0201 0.0236 0.0214 
12 Fabricated metal products 0.0058 0.0120 0.0053 0.0103 
13 Electric and Electronic products 0.0514 0.2313 0.0316 0.0491 
14 Machinery and equipment 0.0143 0.0319 0.0102 0.0063 
15 Transport equipment 0.0047 0.0295 0.0016 0.0041 
16 Other manufactured products 0.0228 0.0325 0.0219 0.0272 
17 Utility 0.0189 0.0490 0.0192 0.0550 
18 Construction 0.0033 0.0158 0.0012 0.0020 
19 Wholesale and retail 0.0220 0.0362 0.0217 0.0379 
20 Transportation, storage and postal 0.0139 0.0387 0.0139 0.0415 
21 Food service and accommodation 0.0066 0.0126 0.0062 0.0113 
22 Business Service 0.0570 0.1023 0.0474 0.0919 
23 Public administration and defense 0.0004 0.0017 0.0000 0.0001 
24 Social and personal services 0.0069 0.0194 0.0037 0.0067 
Total 1.2977 1.7925 1.2977 1.7495 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
sectors. 
The first two columns of Table 7 are the sum of the backward and forward linkage 
coefficients, that is, the total coefficients from the supply-driven IO analysis, 
including direct impacts. The total supply-driven coefficients are 1.2977 and 1.7925. 
Table 7 also gives the demand-driven coefficients. This result shows that both sets 
of coefficients are very similar to each other. However, this result is not general, 
instead being a coincidence. In the work of Kim (2015), the supply-driven 
coefficients of the above-mentioned products (3.247, 3.724 and 4.110) were 
significantly higher than the demand-driven coefficients (1.942, 2.174 and 2.319). 
The impacts of Japan’s export control scheme as represented by the reduction in 
gross output are computed in Table 8. This is obtained by multiplying the direct 
impacts, 13.4 and 6.4 trillion won, by the coefficients in Table 7. The total impact is 
estimated to be 29.0 trillion won, of which the contributions of the shocks in 
semiconductor and display sectors are 17.4 (60.2%) and 11.5 (39.8%) trillion won, 
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TABLE 8—IMPACTS OF THE TRADE DISPUTE ON GROSS OUTPUT ACCORDING TO 
THE SUPPLY-DRIVEN INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 




Backward Forward Backward Forward 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 13,442.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 13,442.4 
2 Electronic signal equipment 0.0 0.0 6,433.9 0.0 6,433.9 
 Total direct impact 13,442.4 0.0 6,433.9 0.0 19,876.3 
 (share) (80.5%) (0.0%) (68.9%) (0.0%) (68.6%) 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 16.0 2.1 12.2 4.8 35.1 
4 Mined and quarried goods 4.4 0.3 26.0 0.7 31.6 
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 33.4 5.9 25.6 12.8 77.7 
6 Textile and leather products 24.8 4.2 20.1 9.6 58.7 
7 Wood and paper products 34.8 2.4 31.3 6.1 74.6 
8 Petroleum and coal products 80.1 2.8 92.1 7.1 182.1 
9 Chemical products 380.8 12.8 401.6 27.8 823.0 
10 Non-metallic mineral products 17.3 2.6 341.7 6.3 367.9 
11 Basic metal products 303.7 6.8 113.8 15.4 439.7 
12 Fabricated metal products 68.8 9.4 54.9 22.6 155.6 
13 Electric and Electronic products 406.8 284.6 262.4 1,225.9 2,179.6 
14 Machinery and equipment 131.8 60.3 33.5 171.9 397.4 
15 Transport equipment 20.8 42.2 21.9 168.0 253.0 
16 Other manufactured products 281.4 25.4 145.0 63.9 515.7 
17 Utility 246.2 8.2 294.3 21.0 569.8 
18 Construction 15.7 28.7 10.8 91.0 146.3 
19 Wholesale and retail 279.3 16.9 202.3 30.8 529.3 
20 Transportation 178.2 9.3 221.7 27.2 436.4 
21 Food service and accommodation 79.6 9.3 60.6 20.5 170.0 
22 FIRES 609.8 156.8 490.9 167.0 1,424.4 
23 Public administration and defense 0.4 4.8 0.3 10.5 16.0 
24 Social and personal services 47.2 45.5 35.6 89.1 217.4 
 Total indirect impact 3,261.3 741.1 2,898.6 2,200.2 9,101.2 
 (share) (19.5%) (100.0%) (31.1%) (100.0%) (31.4%) 
 Total 
16,703.7 741.1 9,332.5 2,200.2 
28,977.5 
17,444.8 (60.2%) 11,532.6 (39.8%) 
Source: Author’s computations. 
  
respectively. The total impact consists of the direct impact (19.9 trillion won, 68.6%), 
the backward linkage effect (6.2 trillion won, 21.2%) and the forward linkage effect 
(2.9 trillion won, 10.2%). Electric and electronic products and the business services 
sectors are the sectors most severely damaged by the dispute. 
The impacts of Japan’s export control on Korea’s GDP are given in Table 9. The 
total impact is estimated to be 13.6 trillion won. This consists of the contributions of 
the shock to the semiconductor sector (9.3 trillion won, 68.9%) and to the display 
sector (4.2 trillion won, 31.1%). The total impact consists of the direct impact (10.2 
trillion won, 75.1%), the backward linkage effect (2.3 trillion won, 17.3%) and the  
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TABLE 9—IMPACTS OF THE TRADE DISPUTE ON VALUE-ADDED ACCORDING TO 
A SUPPLY-DRIVEN INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 




Backward Forward Backward Forward 
1 Semiconductor and related devices 7,800.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7,800.8 
2 Electronic signal equipment 0.0 0.0 2,377.8 0.0 2,377.8 
 Total direct impact 7,800.8 0.0 2,377.8 0.0 10,178.6 
 (share) 86.2% 0.0% 68.5% 0.0% 75.1% 
3 Agricultural, forest, and fishery goods 8.5 1.1 6.4 2.5 18.5 
4 Mined and quarried goods 2.1 0.2 12.4 0.4 15.1 
5 Food, beverages and tobacco 8.5 1.5 6.5 3.3 19.7 
6 Textile and leather products 5.0 0.8 4.0 1.9 11.8 
7 Wood and paper products 11.3 0.8 10.1 2.0 24.2 
8 Petroleum and coal products 20.2 0.7 23.2 1.8 45.9 
9 Chemical products 102.2 3.4 107.8 7.5 220.9 
10 Non-metallic mineral products 5.3 0.8 104.0 1.9 111.9 
11 Basic metal products 57.6 1.3 21.6 2.9 83.4 
12 Fabricated metal products 24.6 3.3 19.6 8.1 55.6 
13 Electric and Electronic products 118.1 82.6 76.2 356.0 632.9 
14 Machinery and equipment 39.0 17.9 9.9 50.9 117.7 
15 Transport equipment 4.4 8.9 4.6 35.6 53.6 
16 Other manufactured products 119.9 10.8 61.8 27.2 219.7 
17 Utility 77.1 2.6 92.2 6.6 178.4 
18 Construction 6.9 12.6 4.7 39.8 63.9 
19 Wholesale and retail 150.2 9.1 108.8 16.5 284.7 
20 Transportation 63.6 3.3 79.1 9.7 155.8 
21 Food service and accommodation 26.9 3.2 20.5 6.9 57.5 
22 FIRES 371.0 95.4 298.6 101.6 866.6 
23 Public administration and defense 0.3 3.7 0.2 8.0 12.1 
24 Social and personal services 27.0 26.0 20.4 51.0 124.5 
 Total indirect impact 1,249.7 289.9 1,092.8 742.1 3,374.5 
 (share) 13.8% 100.0% 31.5% 100.0% 24.9% 
 Total 
9,050.5 289.9 3,470.6 742.1 
13,553.1 
9,340.4 (68.9%) 4,212.7 (31.1%) 
Source: Author’s computations. 
  
forward linkage effect (1.0 trillion won, 7.6%). Electric and electronic products and 
business services sectors are the sectors most severely damaged by the dispute, also 
in terms of GDP. 
Employment effects were also computed. The total reduction in employment was 
estimated to be 53,659 persons, with the contributions of the shocks on the 
semiconductor and display sectors being 27,290 (50.9%) and 26,369 (49.1%) 
persons, respectively. The total impact consists of the direct impact (14, 494 persons, 
27.0%), the backward linkage effect (28,202 persons, 52.6%) and the forward 
linkage effect (10,964 persons, 20.4%). The patterns of the impacts on employment 
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differ considerably from those on the gross output and value-added due to the 
difference in the average labor productivity levels among the sectors. 
We can compare our results with those of Jung et al. (2019). We observed that the 
impacts of the Korea-Japan trade dispute as computed by demand-driven and supply-
driven IO analyses are nearly identical and that when the gross output of the 
semiconductor sector decreases by 10%, Korea’s GDP is expected to decrease by 
9.3~9.4 trillion won, which is 0.5% of the aggregate GDP. This is 30~67% higher 
than the estimate by Jung et al. (0.320~0.384%). 
Not only it is difficult to trace the cause of the difference rigorously, but we cannot 
directly compare the accuracy or forecasting power of these results. There are two 
conceivable causes of the difference, however. First, an IO analysis, unlike other 
methodologies, takes the inter-relationships among sectors into account explicitly. 
Hence, an underestimation of the impacts is likely if inter-industry relationships are 
not considered. Second, on the other hand, the results of an IO analysis can be 
interpreted as ‘instantaneous’ magnitudes of the sectors’ responses to shocks. 
Accordingly, this method tends to overestimate the impact. This is similar to the 
slope of the tangent line of a concave increasing function, as an IO analysis assumes 
a Leontief production function, i.e., fixed proportions among production factors, but 
in reality, adjustments in firms’ behaviors take place such that the effects of shocks 




In this paper, we estimated the impact of the Korea-Japan trade dispute using a 
supply-driven input-output analysis. The Korea-Japan trade dispute, unlike typical 
trade conflicts which proceed into intensifying trade policy tools to affect the 
opposing country’s exports, began with Japan’s export control of three materials 
which are indispensable for the production of semiconductors and display panels, 
two key products in the Korean economy recently. Japan’s action, when effective, 
would inevitably result in a large-scale cutback in production in Korea and thus in 
severe damage to Korea’s GDP. Unlike typical trade conflicts, again, the shock is the 
supply-side version because the decrease in production was caused by a decrease in 
the supply of an intermediate input, which, in turn, was caused by an exogenous non-
economic factor. 
This makes the standard demand-driven IO analysis invalid, and a supply-driven 
IO analysis was adopted in this paper in order to estimate the impact of the Korea-
Japan trade dispute. The supply-driven IO analysis was initially devised by Ghosh 
(1958) and later modified to incorporate supply-side shocks on gross output. 
The results of this paper show that when the gross outputs of the semiconductor 
and display panel sectors decrease by 10% each, Korea’s aggregate gross output will 
decrease by 0.67% (29.0 trillion won), the aggregate GDP will decrease by 0.72% 
(13.6 trillion won) and employment will decrease by 0.22% (53,659 persons). When 
the gross output of only the semiconductor sector decreases by 10%, the decrease in 
the aggregate GDP was estimated to be 0.50% (9.3~9.4 trillion won). This is 30~67% 
higher than the estimate by Jung et al. (0.320~0.384%). 
The results of this paper can be utilized in several ways. The method used in this 
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paper is easy to apply and does not require complicated modelling compared to 
macro-econometric models or computable general equilibrium models. In addition, 
the results are linear and additive and can therefore be used in various scenarios. 
The methods used in this paper can be extended to a multi-country setting. For 
example, we can measure the impacts of a supply-side shock caused by the Korea-
Japan trade dispute not only on Korea but also on Korea’s major trade partners. The 
World Input-Output Database or the OECD’s Inter-Country Input-Output tables can 
be used for this purpose. 
The result of this paper has many limitations. First, the direct impact of an 
exogenous shock, the crucial component of a supply-driven IO analysis, could not 
be estimated rigorously. We ‘assumed’ that the gross outputs of the semiconductor 
and display sectors would decrease by 10% each as a result of Japan’s export control 
based on statistics pertaining to imports of controlled materials and the production 
and export levels of semiconductors and display panels. Hence, a more rigorous 
estimation is desired. 
Second, the timeliness of the paper is seriously limited because one and a half 
years have already passed since the outset of the dispute. In this sense, the results of 
the paper cannot be used to ‘predict’ the impact of the shock. 
Third, supply-driven IO analysis assumes that allocation coefficients are fixed; 
that is, the distribution structure in terms of the demand composition is fixed. This 
assumption implies that customers are not identical to producers, which is regarded 
as implausible by some researchers. 
Lastly, the lenience of using the result based on the method’s linearity is simply 
the other side of the method’s critical drawback. The results of this paper are 
interpreted as the ‘instantaneous strength’ or the ‘direction’ of the economy’s 
response, tending to ignore the adjustment processes of the agents involved and to 
overestimate the impact. For example, firms in the semiconductor and electronic 
display sectors began making efforts, immediately after or even before Japan’s 
export control, to produce the materials in question themselves or to search for 
alternative suppliers. Many of those efforts were successful, which implies that the 
damage to the Korean economy was reduced; that is, the initial forecast 
overestimated the impact. 
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